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In 2007, Kenya descended into ethnic-induced riots and upheavals which left a model nation
bereft with insecurity and political turmoil. I This was due to the infamous 2013 general
elections which were fraught with rumours that there was massive electoral rigging.? This
elicited a knee-jerk reaction from the opposition which rejected the results with haste and
called for mass action.' Ethnic cleansing ensued. By the end of the chaos, more than a
thousand people reportedly lost their lives with over six hundred thousand rendered internally
displaced." The carnage, is reported to have been perpetrated by actors on both sides of the
political and ethnic divide.'
In October 2008, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) published
a report that adequately captured the plight Kenya was facing and also proposed several
recommendations on how to remedy the tumultuous situation ." Key among them being that a
special tribunal composed of both Kenyans and foreigners be established to prosecute cases
arising from the post-election violence." The special tribunal would have sufficient authority
to conduct investigations and recruit staff to conduct prosecutions on those suspected to bear
the greatest responsibility for crimes committed in Kenya. 8
I Kinoti K, 'Is justice for post -election violence victims a myth or a reality?' ICJ Kenya, http://www.icj-
kenva.org/index.php!media-centre/col11l11entarv/611-kinoti-kibera on 06 February 2015 .
2 Kinoti K, 'Is justice for post-election violence victims a myth or a reality?' ICJ Kenya, http ://www.icj-
kenva .org/index.php /media-centre/col11l11entarv/6 J I-kinoti-kibera on 06 February 2015.
3 Kinoti K, 'Is justice for post-election violence victims a myth or a reality?' ICJ Kenya, http://www.icj-
kenva.org/index.php!media-centre/col11l11entarv/61 I-kinoti-kibera on 06 February 2015.
4 Boell, 'Perspectives: Political Analysis and Commentary from Africa' http://www.boeILde/down loadsj.101 2-
08-Perspectives Africa J )I .pdf on 09 February 2015 .
5 Materu F, The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses, ed, T.M .C. Asser
Press, Nairobi, 2015, 46 .
6Waki Commission, 'Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence' Kenya law,
http ://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commissi of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence on 08 February
2015.
7Waki Commission, 'Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence' Kenya law,
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commissi of Inquiry into Post -Election Violence on 08 February
2015.
8Waki Commission, 'Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence' Kenya law,
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commissi of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence on 08 February
2015.
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Ethnic violence has intermittently bedevilled this nation since 1991 and has significantly
hampered our progression as a united, dynamic and prosperous country.? It has resulted in
innumerable loss of lives and destruction of property.!? It has caused fear and suspicion
among the general populace and fuelled their scepticism of free and fair democratic
institutions capable of protecting their rights. Detrimental to flourishing democracy, it has
inhibited significant advancements towards national tranquillity, unity and stability that
would graciously manifest in significant economic and social development. 11 Yet, despite the
recommendations put forth by the Akiwumi Commission geared towards engendering
national pride, unity in diversity and tribal harmony has never been a more far-fetched reality.
On February 12, 2009 , the Kenyan Parliament voted down a bill authorizing the
establishment of a special tribunal to deal with Post -Election Violence (hereafter referred to
as PEV) matters.F This indolence and lack of political will by the government to prosecute
the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes only fuelled speculations that the country was not
committed to accountability.P The Commission also recommended that if it is unable to
effectively discharge its mandate for any reason, the cases should be forwarded to the
International Criminal Court with a request to proceed with investigations and prosecutions
of such persons. 14 Consequently, the cases was referred to the International Criminal COUl1
(ICC) .15
However, five years down the line, no suspects have been held accountable for these crimes.
This is largely attributed to political sway by key players in the international arena.16 As a
result, this proves that international justice mechanisms are highly susceptible to fall victim
to factors like political interference, which have so far rendered accountability for the PEV
9 Kinoti K, 'Isj ustice for post-election violence victims a myth or a reality?' IC) Kenya, http ://www.ici-
kenya.org/index.php/media-centre/comm entarv/6 11-kinoti-kibera on 06 February 20 I5.
10 Situation in the Republic of Kenya , Decision Pursuant to Article IS of the Rome Statute on the Authorization
ofan Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (2010), ICC Report, 25.
11 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article IS of the Rome Statute on the Authorization
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (2010), ICC Report, 26.
12 Hansen Thomas, 'Transitional justice in Kenya ? An assessment of the accountability process in light of
domestic politics and security concerns ' , 42 California Western International Law Journal, (20 I 1),35.
13 Brown Sand Sriram C, 'The big fish won't fry themselves: criminal accountability for post-election violence
in Kenya,' 443 African Affairs I I I, (2012), 244--60.
14 Okuta A, 'National legislation for prosecution of international crimes in Kenya' , Journal of International
Criminal Justice, (2009), 1063- I065 .
15 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article IS of the Rome Statute on the Authorization
ofan Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (2010), ICC Report, 25.
16 Brown Sand Sriram C, ' The big fish won't fry themselves: criminal accountability for post -election violence
in Kenya, ' 443 African Affairs I I I, (20 I2), 244--60.
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international crimes almost non-existent! ". Furthermore , the international justice mechanisms
only prosecute the lead perpetrators and leave other low-leve l participants to get away scot-
free. IS Over and above that , the allegations of possible witness tampering and obstruction has
only fuelled reluctance of witnesses to come forward. This has proved fatal in bringing those
responsible to justice."
Moreover, at the time of post-election violence, Kenya had already ratified the Rome Statute
but had not domesticated it.2o Suffice to say, at the time, there was no provision conferring
jurisdiction over the crimes on domestic courts. Upon recommendation by the Waki
Commission, the International Crimes Act was meant to fast track the domestication of the
punishment of international crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and
enable cooperation with the International Criminal Court in prosecuting the crimes in
question." However, retroactivity, an argument advanced by defendants in the Nuremberg
trials could be similarly advanced by the perpetrators.F They claimed that prior to their
alleged commission, these crimes were non-existent in the law, and thus prosecuting them
before the International Military Tribunal was therefore a violation of the principle of
legality.P
Applying the above IMT jurisprudence in the Kenyan context, one could posit the argument
that Kenya wishes to invoke its sovereignty, as has been suggested , it amended its domestic
law retroactively to provide for the war crimes and crimes against humanity. As such, the
above recourse would not be creating new crimes but would be merely codifying crimes that
already existed under international law with the amendments serving the following role; to
translate the crimes into written law on which domestic charges can be brought. Retroactive
expansion of criminal jurisdiction is also widely evidenced in various common law
17 Brown Sand Sriram C, 'The big fish won't fry themselves: criminal accountability for post-election violence
in Kenya,' 443 African Affairs Ill, (2012) , 244-60.
18 Brown Sand Sriram C, 'The big fish won't fry themselves: criminal accountability for post-election violence
in Kenya, ' 443 African Affairs I II , (2012), 244-60.
19 Brown Sand Sriram C, 'The big fish won 't fry themselves: criminal accountability for post-election violence
in Kenya,' 443 African Affairs III , (2012), 244-60.
20 Materu F, The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses, ed, T.M.C. Asser
Press, Nairobi , 2015 , 54.
21 Okuta A, 'National legislation for prosecution of international crimes in Kenya' , Journal ofInternational
Criminal Justice, (2009), 1063-1065.
22 Materu F, The post- election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses , ed, T.M.C. Asser
Press, Nairobi , 2015 , 57.
23 Materu F, The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses, ed, T.M.C. Asser




jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Canada. However, with regard to the International
Crimes Act, no amendment permitting retroactivity has been made in Kenya to date."
Further, there is no doubt that prior to the PEV, international crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity and war crimes were regarded as jus cogens crimes by virtue of Kenyan
acknowledgement of customary international law. As such, if the criminal violations
committed during PEV were to be prosecuted under their respective titles domestically, with
sole reliance on customary international law, such charges would not in principle violate the
principle of legality.P However, as practice shows, domestic courts in common law
jurisdictions have expressly declined to entertain an indictment made solely on the basis of
customary international law which has not been domesticated. Therefore, it may not be the
best prosecutorial strategy for domestic courts to commence prosecution of these crimes
solely on their jus cogens status."
In light of the above, two problems are apparent. First, the International Criminal Act is not
applicable to the 2007-2008 crimes and almost paradoxically, the victims of the crimes that
necessitated the creation of the legal instrument have no legal cause of action against any
perpetrators of the 2007-2008 mass atrocities. Secondly , the marching off of the alleged lead
perpetrators to the International Criminal Court in the Hague and the enactment of the
International Criminal Act in Kenya was a mere symbolic ideological homage to the rule of
law with little practical significance as it not only failed to address the issues raised by the
Waki Report, but also denied victims the very fundamental right accorded to them under
Article 48 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. This position is tenable at best because this
outcome only pre-empts rather than prevents a second post-election violence.
1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Disconcertingly, the above background demonstrates that Kenya faces concomitant
challenges as it lacks a formal judicial instrument adept at addressing the international crimes
committed during that period; conditions that might pre-empt another PEV in 2017.
24 Materu F, The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses, ed, T.M.C. Asser
Press, Nairobi 2015, 76.
25 Materu F, The post- election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses Springe r
Publishers , 20 IS, 78.
26 Materu F, The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses Springer
Publishers , 2015 ,79.
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1.3 JUSTIFICATION
Cognisant of the fact that the International Criminal Act is all but replete with the competent
jurisdiction to address the international crimes committed as well as the root causes of the
violence highlighted by the Waki Commission, it is evident that a legal vacuum persists."
This reveals the burning need to have institutional reforms that produce a locall y fused and
culturally relevant legal instrument adept at addressing the root causes of the violence, an
indelible part of transitional justice not yet discharged.
Moreover, while there is a noticeable dearth of literature that adequately captures the essence
of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in various fields of private law such as family
law, none quite pens down their employment in resolving international atrocities committed
during transition of political regimes in Kenya. Furthermore, its rather firm foothold in our
supreme law evidenced by Article 159(2) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 only
demonstrates the Sovereign's faith in their efficacy; largely lauded for its affordability and
flexibility. Furthermore, traditional justice mechanisms can adequately address some of the
historical injustices attributed to be a key catalytic element behind the 2007-2008 mass
atrocities and waylay the emergence of another massacre in 2017.
Finally, this thesis will seek to imbue the streams of legal knowledge with an additional
spectrum on the subject by examining the efficacy of traditional justice mechanisms from an
economic lens; a feat yet to be accomplished.
1.4 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
a) General Objective
The overarching objective of this research is to investigate the efficacy of traditional justice
in realizing Article 48 of the Constitution of Kenya in the context of the mass atrocities
committed in 2007/2008 PEV.
b) Specific objectives
Specific objectives stemming from this are:
27 Mbaku Mukum J, 'International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa' Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/- zmedia/research/f Ies/reports/20 14/foresight%20africa%2020 14/03 %20fores ight%2
Ointer





~ To investigate the legal framework anchoring transitional justice in the international
and domestic arena.
~ To investigate the efficacy of traditional justice mechanisms as a viable transitional
justice mechanism in the context of the 2007/2008 framework.
~ To determine what lessons can be drawn from Rwanda to enhance the efficacy of
Kenya's criminal justice system.
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Discussions in the research proposal will be guided by the following research questions:
~ What is the current international and domestic legal framework for transitional
justice?
~ What is the role of traditional justice mechanisms in the transitional justice context?
~ What was the efficacy of the Gacaca Courts in prosecuting international crimes
committed during the 1994 genocide?




Legal pluralism connotes a reality in which two or more legal or normative orders coexist
contemporaneously within the same societal construction." It is often juxtaposed against
legal centralism which describes a society in which all law is viewed as emanating from the
stater"
Griffith introduced a binary distinction between what he termed "strong" and "weak" legal
pluralism." He delineated legal pluralistic regime that is strong to refer to a situation in
which not all law is administered by a singular set of legislations. Conversely, weak legal
pluralism is said to arise in situations where parallel legal regimes co-exist but depend on the
dominant state law for recognition and legitimacy."
28Griffiths J, 'What is legal pluralism?' Journal ofLegal Pluralism (1986) , I.
29Griffiths J, 'What is legal pluralism?' Journal ofLegal Pluralism (1986) , 2.
30Griffiths J, 'What is legal pluralism?' Journal ofLegal Pluralism (1986) ,3.
31Griffiths J, 'What is legal pluralism?' Journal ofLegal Pluralism (1986) , 2.
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Winfred Kamau argues that Kenya has been characterized by a pluralistic regime where
indigenous, religious and state laws co-exist within the same social context.F However, in
Kenya , this plurality is marked by weak legal pluralism, a phenomenon where there is
domination of the normative state order and all other laws are considered insignificant.P
Since independence, the state approach to traditional law has focused on subsuming
traditional justice systems within formal legal structures.I" Furthermore, the application of
indigenous law has long been limited to the sphere of personal law and is curtailed by the
requirement that it must not be repugnant to morality and justice.P Under the current legal
framework for prosecution of international crimes in Kenya, exclusive territorial jurisdiction
has been donated to the formal justice system to the exclusion of traditional justice systems."
This runs counter to the reality on the ground where people constantly traverse the boundaries
oflegal systems.'? For these reasons, this research will adopt a legal pluralistic lens.
b) Restorative justice
Restorative justice is not a novel concept, its ongin being traced back to numerous
indigenous culturea" The aim is not punishment, but the incorporation of the offender back
into the flow of the community and environment.V
Braithwaite, a key pioneer of this theory, asserts that restorative justice has been the dominant
model of criminal justice throughout numerous communities throughout the world for most
of human history." For Braithwaite, restorative justice theory adequately remedies the
deficiencies of the retributive justice theory. Braithwaite gives an account of why restorative
32 Kamau W, ' SM Otieno revisited: A view through legal pluralist lenses ' , 5 The Law Society of Kenya Journal,
(2009) ,61 .
33 Kamau W, 'SM Otieno revisited : A view through legal pluralist lenses " 5 The Law Society ofKenya Journal,
(2009),62.
34 Section 3(2) , The Judicatur e Act, (Cap 8 of The Laws of Kenya). The standard of justice and morality has
been held to the British standard of morality and justice; see R v Amkeyo [1917] EA 14.
35 Section 3(2) , The Judicature Act.
36 Kamau W, 'Law, pluralism and the family in Kenya : Beyond bifurcation of formal law and custom' ,
International Journal ofLaw, Policy, and the Family, 23 (2) (2009), 133.
37 Kamau W, 'Law, pluralism and the family in Kenya: Beyond bifurcation of formal law and custom' ,
International Journal ofLaw, Policy, and the Family , 23 (2) (2009) , 134.
38 Skelton A, Regional Views: Africa, in Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed, G. Johnstone & D. Van Ness ,
2007, 468-469.
39 Skelton A, Regional Views: Africa, in Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed, G. Johnstone & D. Van Ness ,
2007, 468-469.
40 Braithwaite J, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regul ation: The Question of Evidence, RegNet Research
Paper No. 2014/51, http ://ssrn .com/abstract=2514127 orhttp: //dx.doi.org/IO.2139/ssrn.2514127 , accessed on 17
November 2015.
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justice processes prevent cnme more effectively than retributive practices. His reasoning
relies on three core claims. First, that tolerance of crime makes things worse. Second,
stigmatization of criminals makes the level of crime increase even further and lastly,
disapproval of the act by society, accompanied by rituals of forgiveness, serves as an
adequate incentive for deterrence for future crimes.
In Kenya, the practice and principles of restorative justice resonate with the application of
traditional justice mechanisms."! Traditional justice mechanisms seek to restore balance
within the community.f Given the inability of the formal justice systems to adequately
dispense justice for the 2007-2008 crimes, the restorative justice theory would be an
appropriate lens to analyse 'the viability of traditional justice mechanisms to fill the legal
vacuum highlighted by this research.
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW
Historical onslaught of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in Kenya
As previously mentioned, Winfred Kamau posited that the national legal system of any
typical African country is pluralistic consisting largely of statute law, religious law and
African customary law.43 Pre-colonial law in Kenya was largely customary in character;
largely comprising the indigenous laws of a myriad of ethnic tribes in Kenya." Traditional
justice systems derive their authority from these laws." However, upon colonization by the
British, the once luscious legal status of traditional justice systems was severely desiccated
and left unceremoniously for decades to roam in the ominous shadows cast by colonial law."
41 Skelton A, Regional Views: Africa, in Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed, G. Johnstone & D. Van Ness ,
2007 , 468-469.
42 Muigua K, 'Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms under article 159 ofthe Constitution of Kenya 20 I 0'
Kariuki Muigua and Company Advocates,
http://www.kmco.co.ke/attachments/miic lei I 11IPaper%20on%20Article%20 I59%20 Traditional%20 Dispute %2
OResolution%20Mechanisms%20FINAL.pdf on 13 February 2015 .
43 Kamau W, 'Law, pluralism and the family in Kenya: Beyond bifurcation of formal law and custom',
International Journal ofLaw, Policy, and the Family, 23 (2) (2009), 133.
44 Kamau W, 'Law, pluralism and the family in Kenya: Beyond bifurcation of formal law and custom' , 133.
45 Muigua K, 'Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms under article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010'
Kariuki Muigua and Company Advocates,
http ://www.kmco .co.ke/attachments/article/l I IIPaper%70on%20Aliicle%20 I59%20Traditional%20Dispute%2
OResolution%20Mechanisms%70FINAL.pdf on 13 February 2015.
46 Ogendo H.W.O, 'The tragic African commons: A century ofexpropriation , suppression and subversion' Plass
, http://www.plaas.org.zalsites/default/files/publications-pdf/OP%2024.pdf on 13 February 2015.
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This is best exemplified in the famous words of Lord Denning in respect to the application of
common law in Africa in the Kenyan case of Nyali Limited v. Attorney General , where he
observes that."
"It is a recognition that the common law cannot be applied in a foreign land 'without
considerable qualification. Just as with an English oak, so with the English common
law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough
character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed, but it needs careful tending.
So with the common law. It has many principles of manifest justice and good sense
which can be applied with advantage to peoples of every race and colour all the
world over: but it has also many refinements, subtleties and technicalities which are
not suited to other folk. These off-shoots must be cut away. In these far-off lands the
people must have a law which they understand and which they will respect. The
common law cannot fulfil this role except with considerable qualifications. The task of
making these qualifications is entrusted to the judges ofthese lands. It is a great task
which calls for all their wisdom "
Okoth-Ogendo made a passionate argument for legislatures to stop churning out exact
replicas of Anglo-American law devoid of any characteristic distinct to our culture." He
concluded that indigenous law will not succumb so easily and expressed these sentiments
using a now widely acclaimed metaphor. Indigenous law, he argued, long regarded as a
dangerous weed, simply went underground where it continued to grow despite the overlay of
statutory law that was designed to replace it.
Despite the massive onslaught it received , its resilience proved noteworthy. This is illustrated
by its recent acknowledgment in the supreme law of the land and is now firmly anchored in
Article 159(2) (c), the Constitution of Kenya 2010.
47 Nyali Ltd v Attorney General [1956] IQB 134.
48 Ogendo Okoth H.W.O, 'The tragic African commons: A century ofexpropriation, suppression and subversion'
Plass , http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/OP%2024.pdf on 13 February 2015 .
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Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms within the context of Transitional justice
systems
Tim Allen propounds that justice cannot be dictated by an international legislation.49 It has to
be culturally infused and socially recognized. 50The Acholi people have their own unique
indigenous methods of reintegrating individuals who have committed violent acts. 5I Through
a ritual called mato oput, or 'drinking the bitter root ,' they seek restorative compensation
rather than punitive penalties. 52 The local populace are willing to welcome back those
affiliated with the Lord 's Resistance Army (LRA), and can forgive individuals who have
committed insufferable actions.53 Tim Allen summarily asserts that unlike this traditional
justice systems, intervention by the International Criminal Court is a euro-centric imposition
that ignorant of the reality on the ground.i"
This stance resonates with Phil Clark's reflections on International Criminal Court's case
selection and prosecutorial strategy in Northern Uganda.55 Clark performs a critical appraisal
of the factors that have narrowly identified "where, whom and what" the ICC has decided to
investigate and prosecute.56 The ICC's approach, he critics, has been skewed by the Court 's
prioritisation of its short-term institutional interest over discharging its mandate. 57 This is
majorly motivated by the Court's concern to avoid jeopardising relationships upon which it
relies for funding of its daily operations.f Such a strategy, Clark argues, has undermined the
institution's legitimacy in the eyes oflocal populace.59
49 Allen T, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army, African Arguments,
ed. Zed Books , United Kingdom, 2006,117.
50 Allen T, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army , African Arguments ,
132.
51 Allen T, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army, African Arguments ,
132.
52 Allen T, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army , African
Arguments, 134.
53AlIen T, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army, African Arguments,
160.
54 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Afr ica, ed., Royal African Society,
London ,2008,37-44.
55 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa , ed. , Royal Afr ican Society,
London 2008, 37-44.
56 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa , 39.
57 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa , 43.
58 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, 44.
59 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa , 44.
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Mariana Goetz explored the positive contribution the institution's work has brought to
victims and affected communities.I" She acknowledges that although the inaugural
international interventions have been heavily criticised for their detached approach to the
societies they purport to assist, the ICC's mandate includes novel provisions for victim
participation and compensation. However, the implementation of these provisions and their
parallel impact on the other affected populace has been controversial. 6\ For Goetz, the court
should accompany these current efforts with other extensive outreach programs to educate the
citizens on the trial proceedings similar to those carried out by the Special Court for Sierra
Leonoe. All of this is geared towards increasing 'positive complementarity ' and, in doing so,
have a more significant and enduring impact at the local level. 62
Graeme Simpson further critics these caricatured and reductionist arguments against the role
of the International Criminal Court." He posits that polarised debates about the ICC over
alleged inconsistencies between international punitive justice and domestic peace, have
hindered a more holistic approach in considering peace, justice and reconciliation in a more
integrated way, and ultimately mutually reinforcing." For Simpson, rather than focusing on
the institution in isolation, the ICC should be seen as interdependent and co-existing with, a
range of other transitional justice mechanisms that can complement one another. 65
In conclusion, although there is a dearth of literature on traditional justice mechanisms and its
efficacy in transitional justice context in various countries, there exists a lacuna on a critical
assessment of its viability in the prosecution of international crimes committed during the
PEV in Kenya.
1.8 HYPOTHESIS
Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms constitute enablers of peace and justice where
formal justice systems have fallen short in transitional justice initiatives.
60 Waddell N and Clark P, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, 65-71.
61 Article 68(3), Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court. 17 July 1998; Rules 85, 89-93 of the Rule
92(3) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 17 July 1998.
62 Africa Legal Aid, 'On the Shores of Lake Victoria: Africa and the Review Conference of the International
Criminal Court' htlp ://www.africalegalaid.com> on 15 February 20 IS.
63 Waddell N and Clark P, 'Courting Conflict? Justice. Peace and the ICC in Africa ', 78.
64Waddell N and Clark P, 'C ourting Conflict? Justice. Peace and the ICC in Afric a', 79.
65 Intemational Centre for Transitional Justice, 'Pursuing Justice in Ongoing Conflict: A Discussion of Current
Practice ', Building a Future on Peace and Justice Conference in Nuremberg, Germany, 25-27 June 2008.
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1.9 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Research traditions in the international justice arena have long been dominated by
quantitative data collection. However, research traditions in the recent past have paved way
for qualitative methods in international and traditional criminal justice research."
Survey research was found to be the most dominant data collection method in the field of
criminal justice. It is a specific type of field study that involves the collection of data from a
sample of elements drawn from a well-defined population through the use of questionnaires.
This method has been used severally to collect data on The Gacaca Courts as it best explains
how the success of a justice mechanism is influenced by the social environment enveloping
it.67 However, due to the financial and time constraints present , a desk study was the most
appropriate method of data collection for this study.
To guide in data collection and interpretation, this research employed a qualitative approach.
Given the legal nature of the field anchoring the research problem, this research first and
foremost adopt the classical methodology of legal scholars when conducting legal research;
that is to look to the grund norm, the statutory instruments anchoring the field, legislative
history as a comparative case to capture how this dilemma has been dealt with in other
countries with similar socio-legal conditions. Laws and legal institutions influence the level
of success in any transitional justice process. The central question is whether the foundations
of transitional justice in Kenya should focus on capacity building of alternative forms of
transitional justice mechanisms.
In light of the fact that the study will be done over a span of five months , the study will be
carried out in Kenya. As such, this research will primarily rely on the distillation of
secondary data given the time and financial constraint. Secondary data will be retrieved from
the following sources:
~ Archival records from the Kenya National Archives.
66 International Centre for Transitional Justice, ' Pursuing Justice in Ongoing Conflict: A Discussion ofCurrent
Practice ', Building a Future on Peace and Justice Conference in Nuremberg, Germany, 25-27 June 2008 .
67 Clark P, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers '
in 'Interpreting gacaca: the rationale for analysing a dynamic socio-legal institution, ed., Cambridge University
Press, 2010,
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>- Cases from the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.
>- Literature from University of Nairobi Library and Strathmore University Library.
Furthermore, the investigation technique employed in this research will be a correlational
study. It will seek to delineate the important variables and factors that contribute to the
successful prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes using Rwanda as a case study.
The similarity or dissimilarity of factors between Kenya and Rwanda will be compared and
contrasted in order to draw useful lessons from the Rwandan case study and subsequently,
inform the Kenyan discourse on importance of having a complimentary framework in the
prosecution of international crimes and facilitating peace and reconciliation in a country
plagued by violence.
1.91 LIMITATIONS
In spite of the best of efforts that will be undertaken to minimise all limitations that might
creep in course of the research, there were certain constraints which seemed imminent. These
are enunciated below:
>- First and foremost, the study will only be based on secondary data and as such will
only be as accurate as the assessment of data derived from the primary source.
>- Secondly, the study does a comparative study of one country, Rwanda. This IS
because of the limited time allocated towards the dissertation.
>- Another limitation is the potential multi-dimensionality of the factors contributing to
the efficacy of the prosecution of international crimes.
1.92 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter gives a brief background to the research problem. Additionally, it contains a
clear and concise statement of the research problem, the scope of the study as well as the
accompanying research objectives. Furthermore, it outlines the conceptual framework that
will form the back-drop against which the literature on the subject will be analysed . It also
contains a brief literature review on the subject that will serve as a prelude to the contents
graciously outlined in each of the ensuing chapters in the dissertation. Finally , it captures the
various research techniques and methods that are employed in obtaining and synthesizing the
data collected .
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Chapter 2: Legal framework anchoring Transitional justice systems
This chapter provides a cursory glance at the current legal framework that forms the bedrock
of transitional justice in the international landscape. It also investigates the legal instruments
in place in facilitating transitional justice in Kenya. It proceeds to assess whether traditional
justice mechanisms have been sufficiently incorporated to adequately prosecute international
crimes and facilitate peace and reconciliation in a manner that does not heavily assault the
scales of peace and justice.
Chapter 3: The Rwanda case study
This chapter forms a pivotal part of the dissertation. This is because it critically analyses the
complimentary transitional justice approaches that were employed in delivering justice for
the international crimes committed in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide. The aim of this
chapter is to draw lessons from Rwanda that can inform the discourse on policy and legal
framework for prosecution of international crimes and more towards a process of peace and
reconciliation in Kenya .
Chapter 4: Lessons from Rwanda and working towards Transitional Justice in Kenya.
This chapter seeks to unpack the conceptual reflections of the various legal approaches to
transitional justice emanating from the Rwandan case study and the viability of each in
administering justice in the context of the post-election violence. Correspondingly so, this
chapter aims to make a gentleman's case for the employment of indigenous dispute resolution
mechanisms in clarifying the inconsistencies in the transitional justice framework in Kenya.
In the same vein, it advocates that the institutional framework underpinning transitional
justice mechanisms should be rationalized in the context of Kenya 's unfolding realties ; a
critical aspect that is determinant of its success. It investigates whether a bottom up approach
or top down approach is the best method to effectuate transitional justice of the 2007-2008
Post Election Violence, or both.
Chapter 5: Conclusions, Findings and Recommendations
This chapter comprises of concluding statements that reflect an integration of the study
findings, analysis , interpretation, and synthesis of the overarching objective of the study. It
proposes various recommendations as well as practical implications on policy and practice of
the employment of a complimentary transitional justice framework. Finally, it concludes on
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whether the employment of traditional justice systems in Kenya's transitional justice
framework will be successful in preventing another carnage in 20 I7.
1.93 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the central pillars underpinning this legal inquiry. It has
highlighted the analytical prisms be employed in ensuring the effective implementation and
facilitating the sophistication and structure of this research endeavour with one aim; to
provide substantive contribution to the pool of knowledge in this field.
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CHAPTER 2
LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDERPINNING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KENYA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
By and large, the concept of transitional justice emerges in societies In transition. It
encompasses a series oflegal and quasi-legal tools associated with a nation's attempt to come
to grips with a legacy of systematic human right violations and move towards a future in
which accountability and fairness is promoted through the protection and vindication of
rights."
In light of the above, this chapter seeks to describe the statutory instruments and legislative
provisions that address the subject under investigation; transitional justice at the international
level and the domestic level. The legal framework reveals the mechanisms and techniques in
place to ensure the right to justice. Shortly after, this chapter aims to explore the victims '
rights and unearth the myriad of alternatives to criminal prosecution available to ensure the
right to reparation is availed. Furthermore, it describes the institutional framework tasked
with walking the tightrope between ensuring justice and peace simultaneously in order to
facilitate a successful transition of a post-conflict ridden society.
2.2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAEMWORK
a) The Rome Statute
The Rome Statute is arguably the most pertinent instrument anchoring transitional justice in
the international arena.t? The preamble affirms that the effective prosecution of the most
heinous atrocities in the eyes of the international community must be secured and must not go
unpunished." In light of the above, the first element of the transitional justice legal
framework can be identified as the legal obligation to prosecute international crimes;' I an
obligation that may contemporaneously curtail the discretion of the mediators negotiating
68Elster J, Closing the books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, ed., Cambridge University Press ,
2004 .The transition oriented definition has been endorsed by most scholars. However, some scholars have
indicated that the term need not be used even if there is no transition of political regimes; see Roht-Arriaza N,
The New Landscape of Transitional Justice,in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth
versus Justice, ed., Cambridge University Press , 2006. Defining the term as the "set of practices, mechanisms
and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at
confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law".
69 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .
70 Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, The fourth paragraph asserts the rule to fight
against impunity and emphasizes the necessity for national measures at the national level and international
cooperation.
71 Article 4, The Resolution on the Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition,
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Dec 3,1973 ,3074 (XXVIII).
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amnesties with regard to exemptions from criminal prosecution.F In exploring the Rome
Statute, this research will direct its attention to the provisions that serve a pivotal role in the
transitional justice arena; namely Article 17 on the principle of complementarity, Article 16
on instances of the Security Council's permissible intervention and Article 53.
Article 16
This article allows the Security Council to initiate investigations or commence prosecutions
on the basis of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to prevent
occurrences identified as a threats to international peace.P This may ward off the violence as
the perpetuators of the conflicts may take the "threat" by the ICC seriously well before the
actual negotiations start. Ironically, non-member states are not immune from the potential
legal scrutiny availed by this statute. As the Sudan case indicates," even a non-member state
can be subjected to ICC investigations as a result of Security Council referral in accordance
with Article 13 (b) of the ICC Statute." In effect, by such a decision , the Council may lend
international approval to amnesties that are part of an ongoing peace process in the wake of
grave human right violations or it could also stay proceedings which may otherwise be
considered admissible under Article 17.76
However, given the autonomous nature of its jurisdiction, the ICC cannot be construed as
giving complete deference to a national amnesty." More importantly, the ICC cannot be
made to accept an amnesty which would run contrary to its obligation to prosecute the human
rights violations which are part of its subject-matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, it can be
said that the Court has the power to indirectly review the Security Council's decision but is
not inherently bound by their decision."
72 Dugard J, 'Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?, 12 Leiden Journal of
International Law, 1001 (1999) , 45.
73U.N. Security Council, ' Functions and Powers ', United Nations,
http ://www.un.orglDocs/sc/lIl1sc flinctions .htm lUl1ited on23 January 2016.
74U.N. Security Council. Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Sudan , United
Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journaIlasp/ws.asp?m=S/PV.5459 on 28 January 2016.
75 Article 13, Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court .
76 U.N. Security Council. Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Sudan , United
Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journaIlasp/ws.asp?m=S/PV.5459 on 28 January 2016.
77 Condorelli V and Villalpando S, Relationship ofthe Court with the United Nations, in The Rome Statute ofthe
International Criminal Court : A Commentary, ed., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002 ,
212.
78 Condorelli V and Villalpando S, Relationship ofthe Court with the United Nations, in The Rome Statute ofthe




Article 17 captures the principle of complimentary.?? It is not a provision on jurisdiction in
the strict sense but presupposes the existence of national proceedings with reference to the
same events. This article tries to solemnly strike a compromise between the states' sovereign
exercise of criminal competence and the international community's interest in deterring
commission of international crimes. 80
Article 17 elucidates three elements III determining admissibility." First, there must be
investigations into the manner in which the atrocities were executed and the impact on the
victim population. For the investigation requirement, the core issue is whether it takes place
in the first place. The wording of Article 17 remains adamant that the duty to investigate
remains a derivative of the duty to prosecute which rests upon the state. 82
An additional issue accompanying the investigation requirement is whether the objective of
an investigation is criminal prosecution, that is, "to bring the person concerned to justice".83
Indeed the wording of Article 17 (l) ("being investigated'tj.j" does not expressly state that a
criminal investigation is required and leaves room for alternative methods such as the truth
and reconciliation commission provided the legal and factual requirements of investigations
by such a process are satisfied. There is extensive literature that highlights the interpretations
provided in an attempt to fill this lacuna."
Gavron argues that "to bring someone to justice" is to be construed in the legal rather than the
moral sense.86 In turn, this means that investigations of a general nature about past events
which do not individualize responsibility do not satisfy the investigation requirement of
790lasolo H, Triggering Procedure 0/ the International Criminal Court, ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden, 2005, 230.
80 Article 17(d), Rome Statute 0/International Criminal Court.
81 Condorelli V and Villalpando S, Relationship ofthe court with the United Nations, in the Rome Statute ofthe
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, ed., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002,
215.
82 Condorelli V and Villalpando S, Relationship ofthe Court with the United Nations, in The Rome Statute ofthe
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, ed., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , 2002 ,
216 .
83 Condorelli V and Villalpando S, Relationship ofthe Court with the United Nations, in The Rome Statute ofthe
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, ed., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002 ,
217.
84 Article 31, Vie/1I1e Convention on the Law ofTreaties, nnd May 1969.
85 Clark T, ' The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court , Amnesties, and the "Interests of Justice" :
Striking a Delicate Balance, Washington University Global Student Law Review, 2005 , 414.
86 Gavron J, ' Amnesties in light of developments in international law and the establishment of the International
Criminal Court' , 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 91.
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Article 17.87 In the same vein, Holmes, adopts an even stricter stance and argues that the
Rome Statute's provisions on complementarity are solely intended in reference to criminal
investigations." Cardenas also , is emphatic about the necessity of criminal prosecutions after
the TRC's work has been finished.f"
Secondly, there must be a conclusion arrived at on whether to prosecute the matter or not.??
This is grounded on the presupposition that the organ that takes this decision must at least
have two possibilities; to prosecute or not to prosecute. On the rare occasion that a state in its
sovereign wisdom decides not to prosecute the alleged perpetrators, the respective state is still
required to have conducted a systematic inquiry into the alleged violations and arrived at the
decision not to prosecute." By no means should the decision result from unwillingness or
inability to prosecute the case. 92
Of particular interest is the statute's gravity threshold enshrined in Article 17(1) (d).93 These
limitations effectively direct attention towards capturing the perpetrators identified as most
culpable or most responsible in the execution of the human rights violations." In determining
this threshold, the prosecutor takes recourse to several other factors such as the nature and
social impact of the alleged violations, the manner of commission and the status and role of
the suspected perpetrators.95
Unwillingness is shown." for instance, if the proceedings are undertaken in bad faith and for
the sole purpose of shielding the suspected perpetrators from criminal prosecution. However,
87 Clark T, ' The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court , Amnesties, and the "Interests of Justice ":
Striking a Delicate Balance, Washington University Global Student Law Review, 2005 , 414 .
88 Holmes J, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in the Rome Statut e of the International
Criminal Court. ed.. Rome Statute ofInternational Criminal Court , 2002, 667.
89Robinson D, Comments on Chapter of Claudia Cardenas Aravena: Complementarity views on
Complementarity, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 144.
90Williams S, "Article 17" in: Commentary on the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Obervers '
Notes. Article by Article , ed., Otto Trifferer, 1999.
91 Williams S, "Article 17" in: Commentary on the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Obervers '
Notes, Article by Article, ed., Otto Trifferer, 1990.
92Arsanjan M and Reisman W, ' The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court' . 99 American Journal
ofInternational Law " 2005 ,389.
93 Ocampo M, Informal meeting of legal advisors, International Criminal Court https:/!www .icc-
cpi. int/NR/rdonlvres!9D70039E-4B EC-4F32-9D4 A-CEA8B6799 E37!143836/LMO 2005 1024 English.pdf on
14 February 2016.
94 Williams S, "Article 17" in: Commentary on the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Obervers '
Notes. Article by Article, ed., Otto Tr ifferer , 1999.
95 Williams S, "Article 17" in: Commentary on the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Obervers '
Notes, Article by Article, ed., Otto Trifferer, 1999.
96 Williams Sand Schabas W, Article 17. Issues of Admissibility. in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. ed.,Otto Triffterer , 2008 , 608.
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one may argue that an amnesty may be designed solely for this purpose."? Correspondingly
so, if one recognizes the right to a peaceful transition in the transitional justice legal
framework; it would be contradictory to argue that this constitutes unwillingness.
Article 53
Widely described as the interest of justice clause," Article 53 gives the Prosecutor an
additional instrument to exercise his discretion going beyond the rather "technical" Article
17.99 The notion of "justice" in the interests of justice clause encompasses alternative forms
of justice engineered towards the peace and reconciliation such as truth and reconciliation
commissions, traditional justice mechanisms and national amnesties .P'Olasolo further argues
that the authors of the Rome Statute have granted the Prosecutor unlimited political discretion
allowing so explicitly for policy considerations. 101
In an attempt to limit the wide prosecutorial discretion built into this clause,102 the legal
analysis is limited to the more precise criteria.P'The legal criteria stipulated such as gravity
of the crime, interests of victims, age or infirmity of the alleged offender suggesting that his
decision must be legally justified in each individual case .104 A generous interpretation of the
clause provides that restorative justice is encompassed and reaffirms the statues' interest in
securing the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large .l'" A more
restrictive view of the clause argues that the use of the clause on whether or not to launch
investigation cannot be based on considerations of transitional justice.
97 Robinson D, Comments on Chapter of Claudia Cardenas Aravena: Complementarity views on
Complementarity, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 144
98Robinson D, 'Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal
Court " i4 European Journal ofinternational Law', (2003),48 I.
990 ffice of the Prosecutor, ' Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice ' International Criminal Court,
http://www2.icc-cpi .int/NR /rdonlvres/777C95C9-F54D-43 7 1-BF09-
73422BB23528 1143640/ICCOTPlnterestsOf.lustice.pelf on 19 Februarv 2016 .
100 Robinson D, 'Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions anel the International Criminal
Court " i4 European Journal ofInternational Law', (2003), 481 .
IOIStahn C and Zeidy M and Olasolo H, 'The International Criminal Court's Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited ' ,99
American Journal ofInternational Law, (2005) 42 I-31.
102Brubacher M, ' Prosecutorial Discretion with in the International Criminal Court ', 2 Journal of International
Criminal Justice, (2004), 7 I- 95.
103 Brubacher M, ' Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court', 2 Journal ofinternational
Criminal Justice , (2004), 7 I- 95.
104Lovat H, ' Delineating the Interests of Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court' , 1435 Bepress Legal Series,(2006), 88.
105 Robinson D, 'Serving the Interests of Just ice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal
Court " i4 European Journal ofInternational Law ', (2003) , 48 I.
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b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Regarded as one of the most fundamental international legislation on human rights , the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into force on 23 March,
1976.106 ICCPR provisions apply to adults , children and juvenile persons, but the ICCPR
does not present definitions of these terms. It is the first international human rights treaty to
provide special treatment for children in criminal cases. 107 The Human Rights Committee
(HRC) is the ICCPR's monitoring body. lOS The HRC has examined and critiqued minimum
age of criminal responsibility (MACR) provisions in the domestic laws of specific states
parties and the Committee has held MACR for age of 7, 8 and 10 years are too low and
incompatible with international standards.
The ICCPR provides that criminal procedure shall take into consideration the age and the
policy interest of promoting rehabilitation of juveniles convicted of criminal acts.109 Article
10 states that juvenile offenders should be segregated from adults and accorded "treatment
appropriate to their age and legal status.?'!? As Don Cipriani notes , III the ICCPR's
provisions culminate into the following conclusion: each member state is obligated to
establish a respective MACR which should fall within the general limits of internationally
accepted norms .
The ICCPR has further embraced due process protections available to suspected
perpetrators. I 12 Some of these protections include the duty to be "promptly informed of any
charges against" them upon arrest; to be "entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release"; to be "presumed innocent until proved guilty" ; "to have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of [their] defence and to communicate with counsel of their own
choosing"; to be "tried without undue delay"; to be "tried in their own presence and to defend
themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing" or in certain
situations through free, assigned legal assistance; not "to be compelled to testify against
106 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
107Bassiouni M, Crimes against humanity, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Keluwer Law International,
1999,60.
108 United States v. Duarte-Acero, (II th Circuit 2000).
109 Cipriani D, Children's Rights and the Mlnimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, ed., Ashgate Publishers,
2009, 42.
110 Article 10(2) (b) (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
III Cipriani D, Children's Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility , ed., Ashgate Pubslihers,
2009,43.
112 Bassiouni M, Crimes against humanity, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Keluwer Law International,
1999,60.
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themselves or to confess guilt"; and "to have a conviction and sentence . .. reviewed by a
higher tribunal." 113 Although they are provided for minimally during the International
Military Tribunal, these protections are reflected in the statutes of the modern tribunals and in
their jurisprudence. 114 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes, for example, simply reflect many
ICCPR due process protections word for word.
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
a) International Criminal Court
As already demonstrated above, the Rome statute creates the International Criminal Court as
an independent treaty body.' 15 Pursuant to Article,116 the ICC determines the admissibility
"on its own motion". This is to minimize interference from other actors such as the United
Nations and its affiliates. By virtue of Article 16, this curtailment does not appl y to the
Security Council. 117 As the case of Northern Uganda demonstrates, the United Nations acts
merely as a peace broker and has no authority bestowed to commission or retract an-est
warrants.!" On the other hand, the Court's decisions have no limiting effect on third states,
i.e., they decide autonomously on their jurisdiction and interest to prosecute international
crimes. I 19
b) Ad Hoc Tribunals
Ad Hoc Tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, for example, wereestablished by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, an action that can only be invoked
to maintain or restore international peace and security.P'They are one of a portfolio of
113 Dunoff J, Ratner S, and Wippman D, International Law, Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented
Approach, 3rd ed., Aspen Publishers, 2010,441-43.
114 Dunoff J, Ratner S, and Wippman D, International Law, Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented
Approach, 3rd ed., Aspen Publishers, 2010,441-43.
115 Bassiouni M, Crimes against humanity, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Keluwer Law International,
1999,60
116Article 19, Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court.
117Article 16, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
118 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Making Peace Our Own: Victims' Perceptions of
Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda , ed., UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007, 26.
119 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Making Peace Our Own: Victims' Perceptions of
Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda, ed., UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007, 27.
120Tiefenbrun S, ' The paradox of international adjudication: developments in the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the International Criminal Court' , 25
North Carolina Journal of International Law, (2000) , 551.
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transitional justice tools, along with truth and reconciliation commissions, traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms and amnesties. 121
The ad hoc tribunals have remarkable work in the field of international criminal law as they
have created valuable jurisprudence and prosecuted high level perpetrators of human right
violations which is said to assist in deterrence of impunity.F? As pointed out by Jane
Stromseth, new leaders must articulate the issue of accountability for past violations head-on
lest they run the risk that the legal structures subsequently formed will be anchored on shaky
foundations.F' Ad hoc tribunal are located in the state in which the human rights violations
have taken place with the view of incorporating the society in seeking justice. It also seeks to
retain an international element widely acclaimed for assuring impartiality and compliance
with international law as well as enable capacity building in the country by training lawyers
and investigators. 124
Furthermore, the fundamental alms of transitional justice may have played a role in the
construction of the wide-sweeping liability doctrines used by both the International Military
Tribunals and contemporary ad hoc tribunals. Additionally, they have prompted the tribunals
to incorporate extensive outreach programs as part of their broader pursuit of transitional
justice, an initiate that is often out of the purview of normal courts. The tribunals endeavour
to educate the citizenry of the affected state about the trials and their accompanying decisions
in the hope that it will bring retribution to the victims and facilitate national reconciliation.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has received particular praise in this regard.l"
Despite these victories, however, public opinion polls indicate dissatisfaction with the
minimal information relayed about the trials ' goals and judgments.126
121 Weinstein, H, My Neighbor, My Enemy. Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity , ed.,
Cambridge Press , Cambridge, 2004, 29-48
122 Stromseth J, "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention; The case for incremental Change", ed., Cambridge
University Press, 2003 , 232-233.
123Stromseth J, "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention; The case fo r incremental Change" , ed., Cambridge
University Press, 2003, 232-233.
124Nollkaemper A and Kleffner, J, Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor.
Kosovo and Cambodia, ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 , 12
125Nollkaemper A and Kleffner, J, Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Kosovo and Cambodia, ed., Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2004 , 17




Hybrid Courts emerged In as a way to bypass the limitations of ad hoc tribunals 127. As
international consensus grew, they were capital intensive and too lengthy.P'' By mixing
international and domestic law and staff, hybrid courts elicit more participation from .the
citizenry as well as the victims of the human right violations.F? Inevitably, it engenders a
greater sense of ownership over the decisions made in the court. It also increases deterrence
because citizenry is made aware of the fate of perpetrators of human right violations.
Involvement of the wider community seamlessly merges retributive justice with restorative
justice.
The ECCC is good example. It has developed a novel prosecutorial structure where victims
are given a greater opportunity to voice their concerns. 130 The enhanced role of the victim
through civilian party representation victims to articulate their trials and tribulations, claim
non-monetary compensation as well as appeal a decision made by the Trial Chamber. 131
Official exposure of the truth and increased interaction with all stakeholders of the
transitional justice process provides a holistic form of redress to the victims. P? It is
exemplary of the fact that peace and justice can be attained simultaneously, albeit not
perfectly, which is emblematic of the fundamental pillars of the transitional justice process. 133
d) Truth and Reconciliatory Commissions
These are workshops designed to facilitate contrition and forgiveness at the individual level
in the hope of fostering reconciliation at the collective level in a post-conflict ridden society
with the guidance of trained third parties. P" Montville perceives reconciliation as a neat
formula comprising of acknowledgement and contrition from the wrong-doers and
127 Zacklin R, 'The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals' , 2 Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice,
(2004), 545.
128Herman J and Ortega M, ' Hybrid Tribunals and the Rule of Law: Notes from Bosnia and Herze gov ina and
Cambodia' , 7 Working Papers Series, (2010) , 6.
129 Herman J and Ortega M, 'Hybrid Tribunals and the Rule of Law: Notes from Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Cambodia', 7 Working Papers Series, (2010), 9.
l3~ollkaemper A and Kleffner J, Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribun als: Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Kosovo and Cambodia, ed., Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2004,229.
13 INollkaemper A and Kleffner J, Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Kosovo and Cambodia, ed., Oxford University Press , Oxfo rd, 2004, 229 .
132 Open Society Justice Initiative, 'Political Interferenc e at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia', June 20 I0, http://www.soros.orglinitiatives/justice on 19 February 2016 .
133 Open Society Justice Initiative, 'Political Interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia', June 20 I0, http: //www.soros.orglinitiatives/justice on 19 February 2016.
134 Llewell yn J and Howse R, ' Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission ' , 49 University ofToronto Law Journal(1999 ),357.
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forgiveness from the wrong doers. 135 Echoing Tutu's notion ofUbuntu, the national discourse
of forgiveness cannot commence until there is some public acknowledgement of what
transpired. 136
As captured above, TRC's are fashioned by transition governments as the handmaidens of
democracy. With such mechanisms, there are practical difficulties in ensuring the
"accountability" in the utmost legal sense. 137 Kaye, among several other scholars, has argued
that the granting of full amnesties would interfere with the notion of accountability as a
pertinent ingredient for successful democratic transition. 138 The case of Chile is instructive on
this point. 139 Justice was elusive to some of the victims given the constraints of amnesty laws
and presidential pardons. 140 Similarly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission offered amnesty to apartheid leaders as an incentive for them to divulge
information regarding the crimes committed during the period.! "! Further, Article 33 of the
United Nations Charter also provides for disputes that endanger international peace and
security to be settled through any of the dispute resolution mechanisms listed above.
2.4 DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Article 48 is fairly succinct in capturing the legal creature that is access to justice. 142 It
enumerates that the state shall make justice accessible to all individuals irrespective of their
financial disposition. It is essential in casting a degree of credibility in a justice system. It
ensures that the citizenry are relieved with the financial burden often accompanied with
seeking legal services by ensuring efficient, affordable and expeditious access to justice. 143
Anchored firmly in the Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 159(2)(c) serves as the
constitutional basis for traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in Kenya. 144 In light of the
fact that this thesis is investigating their efficacy in transitional justice, the latter captures
135 Montville J, "Complicated Mourning and Mobilizationfor Nationalism ", ed., Brown, 1995,46
136Montville J, "Complicated Mourning and Mobilizationfor Nationalism ", ed., Brown, 1995,46.
137 Dugard J, Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South African Model, in Transitional Justice and
the Rule ofLaw in New Democracies , ed., Leiden, 1997,269
138Kaye M, 'The role of truth commissions in the search for justice, reconciliation and democratisation: The
Salvadorean and Honduran cases. ' 29 International Journal ofLatin American Studies , (1997), 67.
139Hayner P, 'Fifteen Truth Commissions-I974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.' 16 Human Rights Quarterly,
Volume: 16 (1994), 558.
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both a transitional sovereign and its power to dispense justice through traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms during such a period rather succinctly. This study argues, given our
unique stance, there is no persuasive reason why TDRMS should be excluded in effectuating
justice in a transitional context.l'" Further, as Kariuki Muigua observes, not only are they
geared towards engendering peaceful coexistence among disputants after a conflict, they are
fast, flexible and cheap. 146
From the above, one can see why its resilience is steadfast. For instance, Section 5(l)(f) of
the National Land Commission Act, 2011 encourages the use of traditional dispute resolution
mechanisms in resolving contentious land disputes. Moreover, Article 60 and Article 67,1 47
also urge the populace to turn to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve any
disputes in relation to land in an expeditious and affordable manner. In the same vein, Section
68 of the Marriage Act elucidates that spouses who participated in a customary marriage
should aim to resolve any disputes that may arise through traditional dispute resolution
mechanisms before the court may deliberate on a petition for dissolution. 148
However , Section 176 of Kenya's Criminal Procedure Code (CPe) allows for limited
application of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and traditional justice systems.l'"
There is however no provisions relating to the legal stance of traditional justice systems in
relation to international crimes.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The domestic legal framework on transitional justice is patchy at best and devoid of any
substantive rationale behind it. In light of this, this chapter culminates to the conclusion that
there is a case for defensible review of policy and institutional framework underpinning
transitional justice in Kenya.
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The chapter commences by providing a brief glimpse into the catalytic elements leading up to
the genocide. Following this brief exposition, it proceeds by tracing the metamorphosis of
transitional justice mechanisms put in place from their innocuous beginnings to their
successful, albeit controversial, legal standing in the transitional justice arena in post-
genocide Rwanda. Furthermore, it explores the various structures and institutions
underpinning the smooth transition in the hope of acquiring an appreciation of the gaps in the
systems that mayor may not have been ostensibly filled. The review largely seeks to acquire
a granular understanding of the viability of such initiatives as vehicles of peaceful transition
in Kenya.
3.2 JUSTIFICATION OF RWANDA AS A CASE STUDY
First and foremost, the geopolitics of the region mirror each other. The ethnicity-driven
politics prevalent in Rwanda is similarly a characteristic feature present in Kenyan politics. 150
The following example will prove instructive. In April 1994, an aeroplane carrying the
Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, an event that most scholars state, ignited
the Rwandan Genocide. 151 The innocuous political event that ignited the ethnic rivalry
between the Hutus and Tutsi's mirrors the catalytic elements that fuelled Kenya's post-
election violence. Secondly, the principal variables and socio-legal conditions of both
countries are similar. As such the results of this inquiry, subject to the scale of completed
work, would be illuminating and instrumental in predicting the likelihood of similar
initiatives in Kenya. Finally, Rwanda is the only country with\ two incommensurable
transitional justice institutions engineered simultaneously towards the reconstruction of
Rwanda.P? As such, a juxtaposition of both in one legal system would provide resourceful
insight.
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Rwanda is a relatively small landlocked country snuggled in the Great Lakes Region of
Eastern Africa, bordered by the Democratic Republic of Congo on the east, Uganda to the
north and Tanzania to the west, and Burundi to the south. 153
Between April and July 1994, an insurgence of extrajudicial killings and mass atrocities left
approximately eight hundred thousand dead and Rwanda void of peace in what scholars
described as the fastest genocide in history. 154 Inevitably, post-genocidal Rwanda turned into
a country ravaged by the memories of untold suffering.155 It necessitated the establishment of
tailor-made transitional processes and institutions that would serve as an appropriate vehicle
to restore a collective sense of national unity.P" Two principal approaches that emerged in
the Rwandan context is the International Criminal Court of Rwanda and the Gacaca courts. E'
Rwanda's post-conflict transitional justice legal landscape is characterized by a legal
pluralism that incorporates formal international trials facilitated by the International Criminal
Court of Rwanda and domestic criminal trials coordinated by the Gacaca Courts at the grass-
root level.l'" Cognisant of the fact that that for South Africa reconciliation and justice were
incongruent and irreconcilable goals , a truth reconciliation commission was the best fit as the
former was a superior objective for the nation.P? For Rwanda, reconciliation would be
153' Rwanda Geography ', World Atlas , September 29 20 15,
htlp://www.\\.orlclatlas.com!webim age/countrvs/ali·icaJrwanda/rwland .hIJ1\ accessed on 12th Feb ruary 2016.
154'Burundi violence: Scores fle e homes before crackdown starts ' BBC News, 7 November 2015,
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inconceivable without some form ofjustice. 160 The Rwandan model was a candid response to
the UN Security Council need to do away with eschewing the one size fits all importation of
a Eurocentric based transitional justice model.l"'
3.2 GACACA COURTS
Traditional Gacaca
Widely known as Inkiko Gacaca to the Rwandan citizenry, the roots of the indigenous
dispute resolution can be traced back to precolonial Rwanda, a period in which much content
remains scarce given the unwritten nature of information relayed.162 However, there is
existing literature in which most scholars on the subject agree on the fundamental
characteristics of traditional Gacaca system outlined below. 163
Institutional framework of Traditional Gacaca
Traditional Gacaca dealt with disputes in accordance with customary law and practice instead
of written laws.l'" Gacaca were non-permanent ad-hoc arrangements.l'" Their procedures
were flexible and informal. Disputes were adjudicated to members who usually enjoy respect
from the community. The members of these panels were men; women were not involved
unless they were a complainant or a defendant, 166 Submission of disputes was on a voluntary
basis. By and large, traditional Gacaca largely dealt with civil cases such as succession, land
disputes, claims for compensation for loss of livestock or crops, family disputes.l'" On the
rare occasion that serious cases such as murder or theft emerged, they were appealed to the
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supenor chief and ultimately the king who exercised the final judicial power. 168 Social
pressure was the principal motivation for compliance with the decisions of Gacaca. The
objective of the process was to restore peace and order after and facilitating the reintegration
of the offender into the community.169
Modern Gacaca
Prompted by the inability of the domestic judicial system to tackle backlog of cases that
mushroomed after the genocide, the Gacaca system underwent reforms by virtue of Organic
Law 40/2000 which came into force on 15th March 2001.170 The system incentivized
perpetrators to come forward and confess their wrong doings in the form of confessions by
permitting a reduction in sentences for those who come forward out of their own volition. 171
Further, it devolved the right of accountability to the grass-root level; any individual could
lodge a complaint and the complainant afforded the opportunity of facing the wrongdoer in a
judicial process convened by the community.l72 Thereafter, an institutional arrangement
resembling that ofa panel ofjudges was tasked with determining the person's guilt. 173
In 2004, the Rwandan government spearheaded an initiative to modernize and institutionalize
the process with the promulgation of Organic Law 16/2004. 174Among other changes, it
reorganized the Gacaca system by abolishing courts at the district and provincial level and
leaving one court at each cell and establishing courts at each sector level; a court of first
instance and an appellate court. Every Gacaca court had three organs; namely a general
assembly, a bench ofjudges and a coordinating committee. 175
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The basic qualification of a judge is being a person of integrity and being regarded as such by
members of the community.l'" Furthermore, one needs to have attained the age of majority,
(eighteen), be a resident of the cell in which the complaint is being heard and not be accused
of participating in the genocide. 177 The judges could cease to hold office or be removed from
office for a number of reasons including but not limited to, failing to attend three successive
meetings of the court without a convincing justification, disclosing details of in-camera court
proceedings; showing indications of being adherent to the acts of genocide. 178
By and large, the objectives of the newly formalized Gacaca process were to uncover the
truth of what transpired during the carnage, to accelerate the legal proceedings against the
alleged perpetrators; to weed out the culture of impunity and to deliver aiternative forms of
justice through Rwandan custorn.!" Soon after, about 1127 prisoners confessed to various
genocide-related crimes. 180 These results encouraged the government to continue to expand
and legitimize the process.
Juxtaposition of Modern Gacaca and Traditional Gacaca
The modern Gacaca is largely different with the traditional Gacaca in many respects . Unlike
the traditional Gacaca, the new Gacaca was created by written laws and is an integrated part
of the formal state system of administration of justice.'!! It has applied state law instead of
customs and relies on the coercive powers of the state instead of social control to function. It
has dealt with international crimes .P? It has had formal rules of procedure and was not as
flexible as the traditional counterpart.P'' The new Gacaca has had powers to impose penal
sanctions whereas the traditional Gacaca merely had powers to award compensation as a
remedy.P" The old Gacaca is purely restorative while the modern Gacaca has combined
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restorative as well as retributive justice functions.l'" Under the new Gacaca, the consent of
the parties to the process has been irrelevant, as appearance is compulsory not only for the
accused but for the public at large. 186
An avenue of appeal is available for those found guilty; their matter may be awarded an
opportunity for review in the appeal court at the sector level composed of judges from the
same constituency. 187 Finally, the aspect of sentencing is characteristic of the modem Gacaca.
In light of the fact that truth and reconciliation is a dominant consideration for the courts,
confessions are taken into consideration in sentence determination. 188
3.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
On 4 May 1994, Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights then, drew attention to the unravelling human rights violations in Rwanda. In
sensitizing the international community, he convened an emergency session of the
Commission of Human Rights. Shortly after, he published a report in which he urged the
international community to mobilize efforts towards stopping the "wanton killing" in
Rwanda.189
The United Nations has embraced a different judicial suit in the pursuing the perpetrators of
the atrocities committed as well as the violations international law committed during the
genocide in Rwanda. By virtue of Resolution 955, the Security Council established the
International Criminal Court of Rwanda. 190
The jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited in various respects. The ICTR statute confers power
over the tribunal to prosecute individuals who are responsible for perpetuating genocide and
facilitating the commission of other human rights violations that occurred in Rwanda. In this
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sense, it is limited in the purpose for which it is was formed. 191 Secondly, it has limited
timeframe as the ICTR only has jurisdiction on crimes committed between 1 January and 31
December 1994.192This jurisdiction does not extend to legal or juridical persons.'?' but rather
to natural persons only.l'" It has subject-matter jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. 195 This jurisdiction
does not extend to legal or juridical persons, but rather to natural persons only. 196
The Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts to prosecute individuals
suspected of committing heinous violations of international law. 197 However, the ICTR has
primacy over national courts and therefore may at any stage of the procedure formally request
a national court to defer any defendant or case to it. 198 The ICTR Statute lacks a general
article on applicable law.199Being an international judicial entity, the ICTR must apply in the
first instance, international law, its Statute and the Genocide Convention and may only revert
to other sources of law, if international law is not competent to address a specific issue.2oo
With respect to deterrence, it categorically relays to potential enablers of atrocious crimes,
not only in the war-torn state, but to the international community as well, that they will not
escape punishment and condemnation for such crimes. 20 I Secondly, the historical record
provided aids in the development of international criminal law. 202
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In this platform, a victim's opportunity to narrate their full story is often denied.i'" Given that
the focus is often directed towards trial lawyers, impartial judges and perpetrators of the
violations, this often has a disempowering effect on victims seeking more than retributive
justice.204 This is because the sole focus of International Criminal tribunals such as the ICTR
is individual responsibility of perpetrators rather than peace and national reconciliation.r"
Invariably subject to pragmatism, international criminal trials only mobilize efforts to
prosecute only high level officials or senior leaders who facilitated or commanded the
commission of these crimes.
3.4 CONCLUSION
Proceeding on the basis that this chapter fOnTIS the foundational case study for this research
inquiry, it seems fitting that the deductions of this chapters evaluations are relayed into a
series of law and policy implications that would advocate or renounce the efficacy of
indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms in transitional justice arena.
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DISTILLATION OF LESSONS FROM RWANDA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
It is readily observable that both contemporary legislation and the legal institutions
underpinning the transitional justice field in Ken ya continue to drive a certain degree of legal
uncertainty that introduces varying levels and types of inefficiencies. Correspondingly so,
this chapter aims to unpack the legal arguments underpinning this narrative. Secondly, this
thesis proposes that in strengthening the institutional framework underpinning transitional
justice mechanisms, the legal framework should be rationalized in the context of Kenya 's
unfolding realties; a critical aspect that is determinant of its success.
4.2 LEGAL RATIONALE BEHIND IMPORTING THE RWANDAN MODEL
The first pertinent issue regarding the inconsistencies between the ICC Statute and
International Crimes Act and complimentary domestic criminal law legislation as regards
punishment and minimum age of criminal responsibility. Whereas the maximum punishment
that can be given by the Rome Statute is life imprisonment.i'" the maximum punishment that
can be dispensed under the aforementioned Act is the death sentence. i'' ?
Additionally, the minimum age of criminal responsibility reflected by international
instruments is noteworthy. Article 40(3) (a) of the UNCRC,208 stipulates that member states
shall aim to promote the establishment of a penal law that shall stipulate a minimum age
under which an individual shall be presumed not to have the capacity to execute a crime.
Furthermore, Article 37(a) of the UNCRC, obligates State parties to ensure that no child is
subjected to cruelty inhuman acts, including a prohibition on life imprisonment and capital
punishment being imposed upon individuals below eighteen years of age. 209 The Rome
Statute reflects that the International Criminal Court has no competence over persons under
the age of 18 years who are alleged to have executed a crime. 21 0
206 Article 77(1), Rome Statute ofthe International criminal Court.
207 Section 6(3) (a), International Crimes Act.
208 Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 20 November 1989.
209 Cipriani D, Children's Rights and the Minimum Age ofCriminal Responsibility, ed., Ashgate Pubslihers,
2009 ,75.
2 10 Cipriani D, Children 's Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, ed., Ashgate Pubslihers,
2009,76.
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However, for ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, their respective legislations do
not expressly exclude competence over persons under the age of eighteen years.?!' According
to the UNICEF report on International Criminal Justice and Children, no person under the
age of eighteen has been prosecuted to date.2 12 Both tribunals have jurisdiction over "natural
persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute", without identifying a concise
minimum age.2 13 The fact that no child has been charged by either the ICTY or ICTR, is
indicative of the fact that, neither views it as an appropriate forum for trying children
responsible for human rights atrocities within its jurisdiction.U"
The Special Court for Sierra Leone asserts competence over persons between fifteen and
eighteen years of age .2 15 However, it is highly unlikely that they will commence criminal
prosecution of children between the aforementioned age brackets because the court is
required to focus on perpetrators who bear the greatest responsibility.I'"
Paradoxically, section 14 of the Penal Code articulates that a person under the age of eight
years is not criminally responsible for any act or omission provided one can prove that at the
time of committing the crime he or she had the capacity to know that he or she ought not to
do the act.2 17 Furthermore, the definition of childhood has an impact on the age of criminal
responsibility. Article 1 of the UNCRC states that: "a child means every human being below
the age of eighteen years ." The Children Act 2001 affirms this definition word for word .2 18
In light of the above inconsistency, compliance relating to the minimum age of criminal
responsibility provided by Kenya's penal law poses a serious challenge in light of the
provisions of the UNCRC and the Children Act Age of criminal responsibility.
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Further, witness protection concerns appear to be key motivators to fuel resistance towards
transitional justice dispensed solely by the domestic sovereign. I' ? Given the infancy of data
protection legislations in Kenya, it would appear to be a legitimate concern given the fact that
prosecution of international crimes attract a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death
sentence. Furthermore, corruption was noted to be a key institutional factor in Kenya, and
there could be legitimate apprehension about security of disclosed information.F" Without a
clear legislated duty to protect data, it is uncertain the extent to which witness protection
information disclosed to the prosecutor will remain confidential. The fact that Kenya in 2010
did not have a law on data protection only exacerbates the resistance of various stakeholders
in transitional justice to come forward and hampers the process of reconciliation further.221
Additionally, this chapte r seeks to explore the following research question. In the wake of
civil strife and state failure , how sovereign is the sovereign when delegatin g the power to
dispense transitional justice to an extraterritorial sovereign? In light of the Rwandan case
study, this chapter proposes the argument that sovereignty is lost when power to dispense
transitional justice is permanently delegated to an extra-territorial sovere ign.F ? This opinion
is vindicated by the following rationale.
Prior to there being democratic state, however, there must first and foremost be a state.223
Since the state has, to varying degrees in the cases under consideration, but on occasion
completely failed , the early phases of legal intervention must focus on restoring the most
basic function of any state : the maintenance of order. 224 Accordingly, this power can only be
exercised by the sovereign. Given the status of a nascent nation , more often than not, there is
an imperative for international actors to act as temporary extraterritorial sovereigns. Lending
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credence to this idea is Grotius' concept of sovereignty.V'' Grotius proposed the argument
that sovereignty may still be maintained by a "lesser power" even in scenarios of total
subjugation to another sovereign which merely demonstrates the divisibility of
sovereignty.r"
Vastly embraced in World War II literature on transitional states , nation building often
emerges as a term used to describe the process of seeking international intervention to
convert collapsed and collapsing states into vibrant hubs of democracy.F" The wide dearth of
literature highlights the challenge of forging a common sense of nationhood among states
such as Germany and Japan emerging from World War II, and more recently Libya and
Syria.228 The question is not so much the legitimate boundaries of "the nascent sovereign" as
the legitimate character of the sovereign. It is not so much the question of scope but rather of
quality. That is the one challenge all of these cases share in common: reconstructing a
legitimate and effective sovereign. Efficacy is derived when the nation has the democratic
consent, participation, and validation of their own people. 229
Kenya 's resolve to task the International Criminal Court to persecute the perpetrators
responsible for the 2007-2008 post-election violence, does not pay homage to Kenya's
legitimate character as a sovereign.P? First , the lack of an alternative recourse to international
justice mechanisms imports the conclusion that the delegation of the power to dispense
justice has permanently been vested with the International Criminal Court. Adopting
Krasner's lens on sovereignty, permanently delegating the power to dispense transitional
justice results in the loss of sovereignty with regard to that particular function. Logic dictates
that, lack of domestic initiatives to compliment those of extraterritorial sovereign inevitably
225 Nijman J, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry Into the History and Theory of
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008,43 .
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leads to a dilution of this collecti ve power. This opinion is vindicated by the supreme law of
the land.
Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 is categorical in it ' stance that judicial
authority should be guided by certain values. One of these ideals is that alternative forms of
dispute resolution mechanisms such as indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms shall be
promoted provided that they are not pervasive to the Bill of Rights , or repugnant to justice
and morality or results to outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality and if they are
not inconsistent with the constitution or any written law.23 1
A prominent theme in post-conflict reconstruction of Rwanda was legal pluralism. It
demonstrated that multiple legal systems can also coexist both domestically as well as in the
international criminal justice arena. 232 Despite having different objectives, legal pluralism
may actually be complimentary, if not more effective, than a singular legal mechanism
employed in supporting the transition of a nation. From the findings of the previous chapter ,
Rwanda's legal pluralistic regime, within which the ICTR and Gacaca courts coexist, operate
to each other's mutual benefit. Arguably so, this model is more effective in emulating
transitional justice values and their accompanying goals than either the ICTR or Gacaca
courts could be in isolation.P''
Similarly, Kenya mirrors similar socio-Iegal conditions.P" Despite the fact that in theory,
Kenya possess a legal pluralistic lens when it comes to conflict management scenarios , in
practice, the transitional justice arena in Kenya is only anchored on legal monism.P" Suffice
to say, the cultural and legal differences can culminate in such distinctiveness as to
effectively militate that to a substantial degree, the average citizen's right to their own law
has been denied.
23 1Article of 159 (2) , Constitution ofKenya (20 10).
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Unlike the extra-territorial sovereign, the home-grown sovereign has therefore elevated the
importance of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in conflict management in the
Kenyan context.P" Despite this, state practice continues to pay homage to formal
mechanisms as the citizenry are yet to access indigenous justice mechanisms in the
transitional justice arena, effectively diluting their sovereignty in the matter.
Moreover, formal mechanisms employed in the transitional justice arena only pay homage to
the euro-centric ideologies on justice.P? Numerous putatively "post-conflict" states revert to
violent conflict where national reconciliation efforts are absent hence the dire need for
restorative justice; a notion that is absent many international justice mechanisms.v" Many
international interventions such as the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda are often
focused on punitive justice based on euro-centric notions of the concept. Moreover, when
they succeed they bring about a democracy but not peace. Conversely, when traditional
dispute mechanisms are employed as the sole transitional justice mechanism, as in Cambodia,
they bring peace but not democracy.P? Indeed, the lessons of the Rwandan case study are
deeply sobering. Transitional justice mechanisms committed to the task must be
commensurate with the difficult challenge of restoring harmony as well as justice.240
Furthermore, the adoption of an economic analysis of Article 17(1) (d) of the ICC Statute
would advance this study's proposition for a dire need for inclusion of indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms in the transitional justice legal framework in Kenya. The case of
Northern Uganda is particularly instructive.I" In that scenario, gravity was a fundamental
concern assisting the selection of the prosecutor's first case in Northern Uganda.242 The
prosecutor commenced investigations into the crimes allegedly committed by both the Lord's
Resistance Army ("LRA") and the national Uganda Peoples Defence Forces ("UPDF"), but
236 Article 159(2) (c), Constitution ofKenya (2010) .
237 Kamau W, 'SM Otieno revisited: A view through legal pluralist lenses', 5 The Law Society ofKenya Journal,
(2009),61 .
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only proceeded to file charges against the former.r" He repeatedly substantiated his decision
by stating that he was following the admissibility criterion in Article 17(1) (d), noting of
course , that human rights violations allegedly committed by the LRA were more serious and
graver than the alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. 244
Furthermore, as highlighted in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the
extraterritorial sovereign's primary focus is only prosecuting those most responsible for the
human right violations committed.P'The policy interest served by this provision is practical
considerations which include among others, likelihood of apprehending the suspect and
financial resources anchoring successful prosecutions.v" While focusing on senior leaders is
sound within the context of a limited-resource tribunal such as the ICC, indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms such as the Gacaca has adequate resources already in existence to
pursue all the perpetrators who are responsible. In not limiting jurisdiction to a particular
class of persons, indigenous justice systems facilitate universal accountability. Rwandan
courts have tried almost two million genocide suspects.i"?
4.3 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the arguments advanced in this chapter do not entirely support a categorical
choice over either consolidation or a dispersed legal framework for transitional justice in
Kenya. From these findings, it is legally deductible that the legal and institutional framework
underpinning transitional justice in Kenya would benefit from a review. Further, that
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are instrumental in resolving some of the Issues
enunciated above.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Within the context of the preceding chapters, this study has grappled with the question
whether traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are efficient tools in the quest to facilitate
transitional justice in light of the 2007/2008 PEV. This chapter highlights findings enunciated
in each chapter together through a concise thematic reflection on a series of factual
deductions drawn from them while contemporaneously meditating on the overarching
research question. These ideals will be captured in a thematic analysis.
5.2 FINDINGS
a) Legal pluralism in transitional justice
The study found that , within the transitional justice field, multiple legal systems can
complement each other in the quest for transitional justice. International Criminal Tribunals'
punitive focus aid victims in obtaining retributive justice, whereas indigenous mechanisms
anchored on the notion of Ubuntu assist in nurturing an environment of peace and national
reconciliation.
b) Delay
From the case study, it was evident that international criminal tribunals process cases at
unreasonably slow pace. 248 Further, suspected perpetrators are detained for lengthy periods
prior to transfer to the tribunals failing to deliver timely justice. Given the current backlog of
cases plaguing the judiciary, it is deductible that the necessity for indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms in dealing with 2007-2008 crimes remains an ongoing need in Kenya.
c) Affordability
Given the high costs associated with seeking redress for human rights violations committed
during the PEV through the available mechanisms, litigation and hiring lawyers are some of
the impediments to accessing transitional justice by a majority of Kenyans.r" Provision of
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in accessing transitional justice would prove to be a
rather seductive choice for the marginal citizen.
d) Inconsistencies
This pursuit is contextualized in light of the fact that Kenya has a patchy legal framework for
transitional justice. This deduction is grounded on the finding highlighted in Chapter 4, that
248 Forges D and Longman A.T, Legal Responses to genocide in Rwanda, ed., Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004,56.
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